It would seem that the dominant modern ethical frameworks–Kantian ethics and utilitarianism–by virtue of their impartial orientation, are better suited to offer a broad account of our moral obligations to others. These approaches hold that certain intrinsic properties confer moral status and thereby impose specific moral obligations. However, the hypothesis advanced in this article is that care ethics–given its attention to particularity and its partialist intuition, and in maintaining that only relational properties ground moral obligations through degrees of interdependence and relational responsibilities–provides strong reasons for thinking about our moral obligations toward those who are both geographically near and distant.
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