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Truth, beliefs and reliabilist foundationalism

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Vol. 77 (2020)

Abstract

True statements are justified from beliefs that have knowledge as a basis, so for its formulation and understanding it’s necessary to assume a foundationalist position. This article proposes a reliabilist foundationalism, inspired by Goldman’s theory, although with important changes regarding that theory. Unlike Goldman, I think that not all beliefs have to be true, nor any justification of beliefs requires the truth, so that knowledge only allows to justify certain types of assertions, those of assertoric type. True beliefs, expressed through assertoric sentences, would be based on even more basic beliefs, whose justification comes from the appropriate use of language.

Keywords:

Foundationalism, Reliabilism, True, Beliefs, Epistemic justification

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How to Cite
Cabrera Machado, M. (2020). Truth, beliefs and reliabilist foundationalism. Revista De Filosofía, 77, pp. 51–65. Retrieved from https://revistafilosofia.uchile.cl/index.php/RDF/article/view/60451
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Revista de Filosofía
Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades
Universidad de Chile
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