Crispin Wright argues that both the standard that urges to assert the truth, and the one that told to assert what is justified, are distinctive of the assertoric practice. Despite that there’s no difference in practice between them, they are different. But Richard Rorty argues that the reasons given, would force Wright to accept too many rules as distinctive of the practice. Wright admits that those kinds of standards can be unlimited, but that the correct standards are not. To defend this position, it’s enough to distinguish descriptive rules from the prescriptive ones. However, Rorty’s position is admissible, because there seems to be no advantages in distinguishing between those two standards. If these
advantages are not presented (and Wright does not), the resulting theory will be weaker than one that doesn’t pretend to do it (as Rorty claims).
Pailos, F. M. (2015). The behavior of truth and justification and their relationship to the assertive practice. Revista De Filosofía, 70, 119–131. Retrieved from https://revistafilosofia.uchile.cl/index.php/RDF/article/view/35934
