i
La Revista de Filosofía del Departamento de Filosofía de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades de la Universidad de Chile invita a la comunidad filosófica a enviar sus propuestas de artículos para el próximo número de la revista programada para junio de 2025.
Searle, el dualismo cartesiano y el de propiedades: Un déjà vu y dos acusaciones falsas
Autores/as
-
Rodrigo Alfonso González Fernández
Universidad de Chile
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9693-0541
Resumen
En este artículo analizo como, dadas algunas tesis filosóficas compartidas, comparar a Searle y Descartes crea un efecto déjà vu. La primera tesis es la mente consciente que existe en primera persona. La segunda es que aquella se define mediante un concepto primitivo. La tercera es que la intencionalidad implica condiciones de satisfacción internistas. La cuarta es el cuerpo-máquina. Segundo, argumento que ambos hablan desde cosmovisiones incompatibles –la metafísica deísta versus los “hechos básicos”; y como un hecho “básico” biológico indica la no separabilidad entre mente y cuerpo (cerebro)–, Searle ni es dualista cartesiano ni de propiedades.Palabras clave:
dualismo cartesiano, dualismo de propiedades, Searle, mente consciente primitiva, intencionalidad, hechos básicosReferencias
Araujo, Saulo de Freitas (2013), “Searle’s new Mystery, or, How Not to solve the problem of consciousness”, Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 4: 1-12.
Armstrong, David M. (1991), “Searle’s Neo-Cartesian theory of consciousness”, Philosophical Issues 1: 67-71. https://doi.org/10.2307/1522924
Brentano, Franz (2002), “The distinction between mental and physical content (Excerpt)”, en D. Chalmers, ed., Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: OUP; pp. 479-483.
Chalmers, David J. (1996), The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: OUP.
Churchland, Paul M. (1994), “Betty Croker’s Theory”, London Review of Books.
<https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v16/n09/paul-churchland/betty-crocker-stheory>
Corcoran, Kevin J. (2001), “The trouble with Searle’s biological naturalism”, Erkenntnis 55 (3), 307-324
Clarke, Desmond M. (2003), Descartes’ Theory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Danto, Arthur (1967), “Naturalism”, en P. Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. V, New York: Macmillan; pp. 448-450.
Descartes, René (1997), “Carta a la Princesa Elizabeth, 21 de mayo de 1643”, en J. Cottingham et al., eds., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, The Correspondence. Cambridge: Cambridge UP; pp. 217-220.
____ (2007a), Principles of Philosophy, en J. Cottingham et al., eds., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge UP; pp. 177-291.
____ (2007b), The World or Treatise on Man, en J. Cottingham et al., eds., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge UP; pp. 81-108.
____ (2008a), Meditations on First Philosophy, en J. Cottingham et al., eds., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge UP; pp. 1-398.
____ (2008b), The Search for Truth, en J. Cottingham et al., eds., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge UP; pp. 399-420.
Fetzer, James H. (2001), Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are not Machines. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Gillot, Pascale (2010), “Cartesian echoes in the philosophy of mind: The Case of John Searle”, en J. Reynolds et al., eds., Postanalytic and Metacontinental: Crossing Philosophical Divides. New York: Continuum; pp. 107-124.
Heil, John (2004), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Newman, Lex (2019), “Descartes’ Epistemology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/descartes-epistemology/>.
Putnam, Hilary (1967), “Psychological predicates”, en J. Heil, ed., Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology Oxford: Oxford UP; pp. 160-167.
Pecere, Paolo (2020), Soul, Mind and Brain from Descartes to Cognitive Science: A Critical History. Switzerland: Springer.
Popkin, Richard H. (1960), The History of Scepticism: From Erasmus to Descartes. The Netherlands: Koninklijke Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V.
Robinson, Howard (2020), “Dualism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/dualism/>.
Schlutz, Alexander M. (2009), Mind’s World: Imagination and Subjectivity, From Descartes to Romanticism. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
Searle, John R. (1980), “Minds, brains and programs”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417-457.
____ (1983), Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
____ (1984), Minds, brains and science. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP.
____ (1992), The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
____ (1995), The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press.
____ (1997), The Mystery of Consciousness. New York: New York Review of Books.
____ (1998), Mind, Language and Society. New York: Basic Books.
____ (2004), Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford: Oxford UP.
____ (2008), “Why I am not a property dualist”, Philosophy in a New Century (Selected Essays). Cambridge: Cambridge UP; pp. 152-160.
____ (2010), Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford: OUP.
Warfield, Ted A. (1999), “Searle’s causal powers”, Analysis 59 (1): 29-32.
Williams, Michael. (1998), “Descartes and the Metaphysics of Doubt”, en J. Cottingham, ed., Descartes. Oxford: Oxford UP; pp. 28-49.
Williams, Michael (2001), The Problems of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford UP.
